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Abstract Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) has become a quintessential tool in administrative law informing a variety of modes of regulatory governance. It provides a
justification for the regulation of markets based on a quasi-scientific and seemly neutral
logic to assess the impact of secondary legislation by government agencies. A new
frontier for CBA is the promotion of trade liberalization. It features prominently in the
regulatory chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
During the TTIP negotiations, scholars deployed CBA as a ‘‘neutral’’ tool to achieve
greater convergence or reassert divergence and experimentalism in regulatory governance across the Atlantic. A genealogical examination reveals the existence of at least
two strains of cost–benefit analyses in Western legal thought. The first one goes back to
social orientations in private law translating into social–scientific expertise for regulators and proportionality for judges. The second one goes back to neoclassical economics in private law translating into economic–scientific expertise for regulators and
balancing for judges. Today, scholars in their convergentist, divergentist, or experimentalist approaches to governance deploy CBA and regulatory science as a neutral
and quasi-scientific method to legitimize the subjection of national regulation to more
demanding standards. Instead, the genealogical approach reveals that CBA is a contingent and open-ended regulatory tool that justifies Contentious political decisions
about regulatory strategies while allowing lawyers who apply CBA to remain agnostic
on its distributive impact.
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Introduction
In 2013, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) began their
negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), aiming
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to improve the trade and investment flow across the Atlantic. The negotiations
revealed trade barriers created by regulatory differences between the US and the
EU, impeding over 200 billion dollars per year in potential annual gains for
producers and consumers on both sides (Delegation of the European Union to the
United States, n.d). These divergences are ‘‘unintended’’ non-tariff barriers for
exporters when they have to comply with different, and often ‘‘unnecessary,’’
standards on food labeling or packaging to address product safety requirements and
comply with environmental regulations (European Commission, 2016a). In drafts
and leaked documents from EU negotiators, the chapter on regulatory cooperation
states that there should be no restrictions on the right of the parties to maintain and
adopt measures to achieve legitimate policy objectives (European Commission,
2016b). However, national stakeholders and civil society alike worry that, through
international regulatory cooperation (IRC), the new TTIP regime will constrain the
autonomy and independence of domestic regulators.
In order to avoid duplicative, costly, and unjustified regulatory barriers, the TTIP
negotiators have relied on a cost–benefit analysis (CBA) rationale to analyze the
impact of future regulation and carry out a retrospective analysis of the existing
regulation to eliminate red tape (European Commission, 2016b).1 Lawyers and
regulators alike are committed to regulatory impact assessments to first determine
whether regulation is needed or not and whether there are alternatives to regulation.
Impact assessments rely on CBA rationale and regulatory science in order to
promote market efficiency (European Commission (2016c)).2
Today, EU and US administrative agencies and judges reviewing regulations
maintain different attitudes toward CBA, leading toward divergent outcomes or
organizing principles for regulation (e.g. approaching scientific uncertainty vis a vis
new risks) (Sunstein, 2005, p. 351). Instead of focusing on a singular or dominant
approach to regulatory governance (Bevir and Phillips, 2017, p. 17), this article
considers several differing genealogies of CBAs and their critiques, taking into
consideration the totality of ideologies that lies beneath the emergence of a specific
belief about governance within a certain period of time (Foucault, 1977, p. 76). The
genealogical approach departs from assessing convergence, divergence, or
experimentalism in regulatory governance, focusing instead on the strengths and
weaknesses, breakdowns, and forms of resistance in legal reasoning to show the
contingent and historical construction of a scientific rationality for regulators and
judges (Foucault, 1977, pp. 76, 80).
Part I offers a background of the so-called ‘‘horizontal’’ dimension or the
regulatory chapter of the TTIP, as opposed to its ‘‘vertical’’ chapters addressing
specific industry sectors. Part II maps three modes of regulatory governance that
lawyers have developed through convergence, divergence, and experimentalist
approaches in order to reconcile the challenges that have emerged in international
regulatory cooperation (IRC). Part III traces the existence of two genealogies of cost–
benefit analysis that had profound influence in the way regulators and judges assess
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the impact and effects of regulations in markets and societies. In departing from
regulatory governance as a unified concept with a coherent scientific rationale, this
article shows the evolving meaning, implementation, and critiques of CBA as a nonneutral tool driving decision making. Part IV shows how convergence, divergence,
and experimentalist approaches to regulatory governance fail to engage with the
historical contingency and the critiques of CBA as a non-scientific tool for regulatory
review (Rose-Ackerman, 2011), as well as the pressure placed on the Commission
through TTIP to adopt CBA for regulatory review (Bartl, 2016). The article debunks
the notion that CBA maintains a linear and rational intellectual history, and that its
application, despite its global proponents praising it for its transparency and
neutrality in regulatory review (see note 1) (Livermore et al, 2013), remains highly
conflicted and indeterminate (Kennedy, 1981, p. 387).
I. The Horizontal Dimension of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
The TTIP negotiations are not the result of a new trend toward greater trade
liberalization between the EU and the US (Egan, 2014). While the progress toward
the current negotiations started in 2013 appears steady and gradual, in reality the
EU and the US sought to identify opportunities for further trade liberalization since
1995 by establishing the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) in Madrid to
serve as a forum for greater cooperation and communication for industry. After
2000, experts recognized that substantive liberalization efforts would require
confronting regulatory divergences that remained in place despite transatlantic
sectoral mutual recognition agreements in the 1990s (Shaffer, 2002, p. 37).
Even though membership in the World Trade Organization reduced tariff barriers
and achieved substantial liberalization between the two markets, differences in
domestic regulations, industry standards, and administrative practices continue to be
significant non-tariff trade barriers. WTO disputes, alone, illustrate the extent to
which behind the border governmental action has posed a challenge to market access,
whether it concerns agriculture imports from the US (such as beef, chicken, or
genetically modified soybeans) (European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 2006; European Communities –
Certain Measures Affecting Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United
States) or European exports (such as chicken and cheese) (United States – Measures
Affecting Imports of Poultry Products, 1997). Since the EU has refused to implement
some WTO Appellate Body rulings on beef raised with hormones and genetically
modified agriculture products, some of these trade barriers appear insurmountable.
While negotiators pursue a grand bargain that seeks to eliminate regulatory
differences and chart a new path for transatlantic trade relations based on scientific
rationality, to others these challenges appear substantial, institutional and in some
sense even existential (Pollack and Shaffer, 2009).
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One often-cited cause of the intractability of regulatory conflict is the differing
sets of regulatory philosophies in the US and Europe. The US is said to be ‘‘risktaking,’’ while Europe is portrayed as ‘‘risk-averse.’’ While this binary assessment
has been challenged by political scientists and lawyers alike, it nevertheless
maintains salience to policymakers and regulators involved in the negotiations
(Vogel, 2012; Wiener and Rogers, 2002; Wiener et al, 2011; Kimball, 2015). While
public opinion remains concerned with whether the EU and the US can reconcile
such divergent regulatory approaches, especially in light of the Greenpeace leaks
on TTIP (Greenpeace, n.d.), the technical conversation spurred by lawyers and
regulators resorts to the use of convergence in legal reasoning, learning from
regulatory variation and scientific rationality in regulatory governance (Majone,
1996).
In fact, lawyers, regulators, and trade negotiators have realized that the
challenges to overcome the so-called technical barriers to trade are not merely
philosophical, but grounded in legal and regulatory practices (Bermann, 2000).
These issues are addressed in the Commission’s proposal on Regulatory
cooperation (European Commission, n.d.). Take, for instance, industry standards
and their administrative supervision or legal incorporation by agencies (Bremer,
2012, p. 136). These have featured prominently in the TTIP negotiations, due to the
different production and use of industry standards across the Atlantic. For instance,
in Europe, standards are set and adopted by three centralized institutions, to which
all national standards bodies are subordinate. National standards bodies also
comprise the central standard bodies’ membership. By contrast, the US is home to a
‘‘wild west’’ of standards bodies, and the market often dictates the validity of these
standards. The result is that, while hundreds of product standards exist, only a small
share – about 20 per cent – makes up more than 80 per cent of the market.
Nonetheless, regulatory assessments of standards vary widely (Egan, 2001; Büthe
and Mattli, 2011).
Led by the European Commission and its trade negotiators, the EU has been
willing to share drafts of its position and open up its administrative system to
scrutiny from its US counterpart to identify ‘‘regulatory equivalences’’ and
commonalities on horizontal regulatory issues (Bercero, 2015). Yet this transatlantic regulatory dialogue has created not only numerous tensions between the two
countries but also several important roadblocks in the TTIP negotiations. For
instance, the European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for Trade faces
political and technical pressures from the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) to accept the advantages of its regulatory system as more efficient and
transparent with streamlined cost–benefit procedures.
On the other hand, the Commission prides itself on its methodological pluralism
in carrying out impact assessments and its proactive, more democratic, institutional
attempt to involve large groups of civil society representatives in regulatory
processes (Meuwese, 2015). For instance, DG Trade has supported the creation of
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790
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an international regulatory mechanism in TTIP modeled after the Canada–US
Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC) in order to facilitate the exchange of
information among agencies rather than reproduce the OIRA model of centralized
supervision in US regulation (Chase and Pelkmans, 2015).
Because of these challenges and tensions in the TTIP negotiations, regulatory
governance scholars engaged in transatlantic regulatory cooperation in radically
different ways by seeking for solutions or embracing its differences.
II. Convergence, Divergence and Experimental Approaches to Regulatory
Governance
To explain the different approaches to regulatory governance, scholars have
addressed the issue from several normative perspectives. From the perspective of
convergentists scholars, trade negotiators and regulators share common aspirations
to establish the ‘‘best’’ administrative law practices and ‘‘common’’ institutional
arrangements. From the perspective of divergentists scholars, history and
institutional path dependencies show that regulatory cooperation will gloss over
fundamental differences, creating unintended consequences in transatlantic trade
agreements. Finally, experimentalists embrace regulatory cooperation as a ‘‘living
agreement’’ or a ‘‘laboratory’’ in which convergence might happen or not happen
through bottom-up processes ascertaining regulatory equivalences and learning by
monitoring.
Regulatory governance in TTIP

Convergentists

Divergentists

Experimentalists

Goals

TTIP challenges

Regulatory tools

CBA

Approximate
regulatory
assumptions
Comparative law
and history of
regulation

Transparency
and efficiency
in regulation
Regulatory path
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From a convergence standpoint, scholars are committed to achieving transatlantic regulatory cooperation because there has been a commitment of industry and
government alike since the 1990s (Parker, 2016). To this end, scholars of Global
Administrative Law (GAL) have put forward an ambitious agenda to achieve
greater convergence among administrative law principles (Krisch and Kingsbury,
2006, p. 1). In tracking commonalities and differences, the convergentist
aspirations lie in Western administrative principles of promoting public transparency and public participation in administration. Yet, in practice, transparency
has proven to be divisive throughout the TTIP negotiations, in part because it
created different opportunities for groups and individuals in regulatory decisionmaking processes (Nicola, 2015). In the cost–benefit analysis, many found a central
tool to promote wealth maximization and regulatory efficiency (Alemanno, 2012,
pp. 6–7). These scholars aim at improving regulatory quality by making regulation
more transparent and efficient while balancing autonomy and coordination (Parker,
2016, p. 9). Therefore, their TTIP proposal ‘‘streamlines’’ CBA and differing
European and US approaches to impact assessments by establishing a middle
ground between the two (Wiener and Alemanno, 2015).
From a divergentist standpoint, comparative administrative lawyers have shown
that there are regulatory divergences between administrative law regimes. Their
work highlights the EU’s more ‘‘proactive’’ approach in comparison with the US’s
‘‘reactive’’ approach to regulating their respective markets. As a result, EU
economic regulation invites producers and labor groups to the negotiating
table early on through institutional channels in a neo-corporativist fashion
(Bignami, 2016). On the other hand, the US regulatory focus is reactive insofar
as it invites ex-post a plurality of stakeholders to participate in the regulatory
process after the proposed rule is released (Bignami, 2010).3 For instance, the US
prides itself on its notice-and-comment process for agency rulemaking because it
ensures a high level of participation, ranging from economic actors to civil society
at large, while requiring agencies to take into consideration the public comments
under the threat of litigation. Although, in practice, this process does not entail
‘‘effective’’ opportunities for participation – agencies are not required to monitor
participation and solicit underrepresented groups – the USTR can put forward its
notice-and-comment process as a hard and tested model for regulatory participation at the negotiating table (Wagner, 2016).
Divergentists tend to downplay the importance of achieving regulatory
cooperation through TTIP. Rather than addressing how to achieve regulatory
cooperation, these scholars continue to demonstrate the reasons why differences
exist and why regulatory review should be understood more broadly in the context
of executive and judicial branches (Rose-Ackerman, 2013). For instance, rather
than seeking to improve CBA as an appropriate tool for regulatory review, Susan
Rose-Ackerman argues that its hegemony ought to be challenged due to the limited
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number of policy choices and values that are included in the analysis when
efficiency is the overriding concern (Rose-Ackerman, 2011).
Finally, experimentalist scholars have coined the idea of Global Experimental
Governance (GXG) out of recognition that there are gains to be made not only in
terms of comparative advantage and international trade, but also through acquiring
new skills and learning through regulatory variation across different countries (de
Burca et al, 2014). Regulatory variation could increase gains from trade and
additional information sharing by taking into account locally formed opinions.
However, proponents of GXG outline some of its underlying and necessary
conditions, such as uncertain and diverse environments, the commitment of key
actors on basic principles, and cooperation among newly formed civil society
actors as agenda setters or problem solvers (de Burca et al, 2014, p. 13). For
instance, Wiener and Alemanno (2015) have shown that in TTIP regulatory
variation can be carried out in many different ways to achieve learning through
experimentation.
Experimentalists argue in favor of an experimentalist laboratory for regulation in
TTIP that will leverage the benefits of variation through a central governing body
which can monitor and select the best practices for regulatory lawmaking (Wiener
and Alemanno, 2015, pp. 9–21). This permanent body would identify sectors where
new regulation may be aligned and facilitate cooperation through monitoring and
exchanging information on principles, establishing procedures for participation,
and carrying out impact assessments (European Union, 2015). Their experimental
approach, however, presumes that the penalty for noncooperation is a high
economic loss and that both the EU and US share Western administrative law
values. Experimentalist scholars are increasingly looking at TTIP as a way to
induce regulators in the EU and the US to consider the global impact of regulation
and align their regulatory outcomes. This may occur through mutual recognition of
existing standards or by using regulatory equivalences that allow learning from
variation (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012). This transatlantic laboratory will further allow
regulators to discuss their solutions to different administrative problems and to
gather public input that is essential for the success of this mechanism at all stages
(Wiener and Alemanno, 2015). Only then will regulators be able to decide whether
and how regulations can converge. Experimentalist lawyers aim to reconcile
conflicting interests by balancing reasons that can universally apply to identify best
practices, allowing each country to decide whether and how regulatory convergence should occur. In doing so, they promote CBA as a neutral, coherent and
scientific tool for international regulatory cooperation.
Convergentist, divergentist and experimentalist scholars all engage in knowledge
production with more or less emphasis on TTIP to ensure that lawyers assisting
trade negotiators and regulators remain ‘‘on top’’ of regulatory governance (Garth
and Dezelay, 2014).
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III. Genealogies of Cost–Benefit Analysis in Administrative Law
This part introduces a genealogical approach to tracing the development of two
alternative modes of understanding of CBA as used today in regulatory reviews. A
first genealogy can be traced back to the ‘‘socialization’’ of private law in the
twentieth century, which introduced pluralist, corporativist, and organic understandings of society and its institutions (Kennedy, 2006, pp. 40–41). In legal
reasoning, this led lawyers, judges, and jurists to deploy social–scientific principles
for regulation and balancing tests for judicial review. A second genealogy can be
traced back to the Chicago law and economics approach to private law in the 1970s,
which later influenced 1990s administrative law in which cost–benefit analysis
became central to welfare economics based on Kaldor–Hics efficiency, transaction
costs, and willingness to pay (Kaplow and Shavell, 2002). Each genealogy appears
well entrenched on each side of the Atlantic as the social genealogy resonates with
EU-educated economists and lawyers working in the Commission, whereas the
Chicago law and economics genealogy is predominant among US-trained
economists and lawyers working in the executive branch.
1. The Social Genealogy of CBA
In contrast to the formalist mid-nineteenth century approach to contract law that
was rooted in natural law and translated into private law through the notion of
individual rights and aimed to guarantee private individuals freedom from any
interference in the enjoyment of their private rights (Wieacker, 1967a, b),4 a social
intellectual tradition emerged in Europe at the turn of the century. During the early
twentieth century, the idea that the state was increasingly involved in market
economies in social democracies led to the expansion of the administrative state
with the goal of limiting non-neutral private law regimes. For instance, lawyers
began showing how freedom of contract and private property rules created unequal
entitlement regimes through coercion rather than ‘‘market freedom’’ (Kennedy,
1991). During the Weimar Republic, scholars like Herman Heller, Franz Neuman
and Hugo Sinzheimer analyzed labor, consumer and housing law to advance ideas
of neo-corporatism, which built on theories of legal pluralism in administrative law
put forward by Otto Von Gierke and Santi Romano.
The social intellectual tradition created its own ‘‘vocabulary of legal concepts’’
(Kennedy, 2003) that underwent a radical shift when European scholars elaborated
a critique of contractual freedom (Collins, 1997). Their approach was based on the
social and moral perception that industrialization heightened existing economic
disparities and created unfairness between contracting parties. For instance,
Jhering’s (1879) critique of individual sovereignty brought into question the
coherence of legal reasoning, which was no longer a matter of deductive
interpretation but was rooted in mechanical social causes and moved by human
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790
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ends. French and German scholars, such as Josserand or Gierke, gained prominence
by reacting to the formalist thinking of the classical era (Kennedy, 2003).5
For social jurists, the unfairness resulting from the individualist doctrine of
freedom of contract was to be corrected by an objective notion of contract,
endorsing altruistic values and state intervention. A contract was no longer based
on the subjective intention of the parties as an expression of their free will, but
required a limitation of contractual freedom to fulfill the objective function of those
transactions involving a plurality of social and economic interests (Durkheim,
1998). In response to the rapid industrialization and the growing interdependence
of social reality in the beginning of the twentieth century, the objective function of
contract developed as a doctrine to address inequalities in Western legal thought
and to protect disadvantaged groups and minorities through special legislations
(Wieacker, 1967a, b).
The notion of an organic solidarity was founded by republican states on the
division of labor which simultaneously increased specialization and interdependence among individuals (Donzelot, 1984). The rise of organic solidarity in an
increasingly specialized and interdependent society whose members were informed
through representatives of the administrative state in the housing sector after WWI
became a ‘‘coerced housing economy’’ in which state agencies were intimately
involved (Wieacker, 1967a, b). While state regulators were seeking to adopt more
objective socio-scientific criteria, judges deployed proportionality as quasi-administrative reviewers of regulation. Proportionality became the quintessential method
for judges to produce ad hoc rules that were based on balancing conflicting interests
of the parties while making legal reasoning appear more rational and objective.
A quintessential example of this form of common faith in judicial balancing or
proportionality in German and French legal traditions is evident in the famous
Cassis de Dijon ruling in 1979 (Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral A.G. v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein).6 In Cassis, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) held that a legislation having the equivalent effect of quantitative restrictions
to trade,7 thus limiting the free movement of goods, was permitted only in nondiscriminatory cases when a Member State, regulating the alcohol content for
consumer protection or public health reasons, was doing so in a proportionate
manner. After Cassis, European judges were called to balance whether any
Member State legislation to protect a specific public interest could limit the market
freedoms (goods, people, services and capitals) as long as the measure at stake was
proportionate to the goals of the measure in question. Proportionality allowed
judges, almost in a parallel way to CBA’s attempt to balance different goals by
translating them narrowly into a monetary scale of value, to list the public interest
aim, less restrictive means and balancing of conflicting interests, including broadly
qualitative and quantitative results.
Judicial balancing appeared as a lifesaver to federalists who believed that the
legal challenge to the European Community was the issue of reconciling the
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790
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authority the different Member States with the economic drive to integrate the
internal market. The compromise struck between the Court and the Commission
and their agreement over a ‘‘managed mutual recognition’’ approach (Nicolaı̈dis,
2016) represented the commitment of both judges and regulators to integrate the
market by reconciling both free market and social goals in European Regulation.
In the past decade, however, skepticism toward proportionality has emerged in
European jurisprudence (Joerges and Rodl, 2009). Shortly before the financial crisis
in 2008, scholars began to lose faith in the proportionality analysis when, through
cases such as Viking and Laval, the Court balanced workers’ and social protections
against the free movement of services by favoring the second over the first ones (de
Vries, 2013).8 At this point, those who thought that proportionality was a judicial
tool able to tame the privatization of services in the single market lost their faith in
legal reasoning. As a result, the increasing faith in regulators, rather than judges,
went hand-in-hand with the EU moving away from its obscure comitology process
and introduce instead ambitious Integrated Impact Assessment model committed to
transparent and neutral regulatory science. However, the Commission’s Impact
Assessment model was committed to multi-criteria analysis departing from welfare
economics predominant in the US approach (COM, 2002).
The European Commission articulated a template for regulatory impact
assessments based on three distinct pillars – economic, social and environmental
– thereby establishing a trifurcated approach to assessing regulations (Radaelli,
2009). The consequence was that, while regulatory impact assessments in the US
seek to harmonize competing interests through monetizing the various interests and
effects of regulatory action, the EU followed a siloed approach and would produce
impact assessments separately under the three pillars (Close and Mancini, 2007).
This philosophy was articulated at the 2001 Stockholm Council, where ministers
agreed that ‘‘economic growth, social cohesion, and environmental protection must
go hand in hand’’ (European Commission, COM, 2001a). Thus, economic
considerations were to be considered alongside social and environmental concerns,
with no single area outweighing the others. Even though this system has since been
reformed to integrate the three pillars into a single impact assessment under the
pretext of regulatory simplification, the siloed approach persists to this day
(European Commission, COM, 2015a). Even while cost–benefit analysis methodology is further integrated into assessments, they are not compulsory, and
qualitative concerns overcame quantitative concerns in a number of circumstances
(Close and Mancini, 2007).
Another difference was timing of impact assessments. Whereas the US approach
to CBA follows regulatory agency action in a field defined by the legislature,
regulatory acts in the EU are taken under the co-decision procedure, which requires
the full participation of the executive, the Commission and the legislature, and the
European Parliament and the Council.9 Impact assessments of regulations are
undertaken in the drafting phase of the regulations (Close and Mancini, 2007),
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consider the extent to which regulations are necessary, and the appropriateness of
European regulations versus deferring to Member State action (COM, 2001b,
p. 428). The consequence of the timing is that Commission regulations advanced to
the Council and Parliament may be substantially amended to nullify the findings of
impact assessments, as opposed to US impact assessments, which consider how
the regulation will operate in practice (Close and Mancini, 2007, p. 8).
While US impact assessments are a function of a regulatory dialogue with
stakeholders and the public, the European Commission’s impact assessments are
the bases of technical discussions between the executive and legislative branches of
the European Union, with input from the public solicited by the Commission
(Radaelli, 2010, p. 273). Consequently, EU impact assessments shape the political
debate over authorizing legislation and make sure that all sectors of society are
involved. In practice, this leads to a greater reliance on qualitative analysis when
confronted with factors which cannot be assessed quantitatively (European
Commission, SWD, 2015b). For instance, Close and Mancini (2007) argue that the
greater reliance on qualitative criteria in Commission impact assessments has led to
preferences against regulation due to the perceived social impact of a measure, due
in large part to the utilization of impact assessments when considering broad policy
initiatives.
Today, regulatory impact assessment review has been the subject of ongoing
reform, with the latest iteration announced in May 2015 (COM, 2015a). The
reform, titled ‘‘Better Regulation for Better Results – An EU Agenda,’’ expands
stakeholder participation in regulatory review and seeks to promote ‘‘smarter’’
regulation (COM, 2015a). Further, the reforms expand programs such as the
Regulatory Fitness Programme (REFIT) and empower the Regulatory Scrutiny
Board (formerly the Impact Assessment Board) to process and assess reviews by
the Commission. Even though the convergence of the US and EU regimes is
obvious and it is driven by the necessity of achieving regulatory cooperation in
TTIP, the philosophical approaches of impact assessments most substantively
differentiate the US approach from its EU counterpart. The social-genealogical
origins of European regulatory impact assessments remain ever present under the
Better Regulation Agenda and continue to reflect the transatlantic divergence over
purely economic CBA in the US versus the holistic approach practiced with CBA
in the EU.
2. The Chicago Law and Economic Genealogy of CBA
In the United States, the concept of cost–benefit analysis can be traced back to
neoclassical economics that was further developed in private law by the Chicago
rational choice approach in the 1970s. CBA was later modified by behavioral law
and economics and migrated to regulation in the 1990s.
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The hegemonic concept of efficiency in CBA can be traced back to the Pareto
principle in which a project is desirable if it makes at least one person better off
without making anyone else worse off (Calabresi, 1991, pp. 1218–1219). Because
most government interventions hurt some people, and compensating all individuals
is unfeasible, economists deployed the Kaldor–Hicks approach holding that a
project is desirable if its beneficiaries are enriched enough that they could
overcompensate those hurt by the governmental action, thereby enabling the
decision maker to quantify positive and negative effects of action (Coleman, 1980).
This new approach increased the range of actions that could be evaluated under
Pareto’s ideas as well as simplified the evaluation process.
Kaldor–Hicks, however, was vulnerable to approving regulations that did not
benefit anyone, and it barred regulations that appeared sensible to allow dollars to
be used for every calculation. While it was clear that agencies should use CBA to
maximize utility, no practical method of weighing costs and benefits had been
determined. Scholars such as Adler and Posner put forward CBA as a proxy for
overall well-being in regulatory decision making, arguing that it is an imperfect but
practical tool by which governmental decision makers implement the criterion of
overall welfare (Adler and Posner, 2006). They further argue that CBA is consistent
with political theories, which hold that the government should care about the
overall wellbeing of its citizens. They aim to detach CBA from Kaldor–Hicks
efficiency, which they argue lacks moral relevance and instead see CBA as a rough,
administrable proxy for overall well-being through the lens of weak welfarism – a
moral view that sees overall well-being as one among a possible plurality of
foundational moral criteria. They propose that agencies screen out poorlyinformed or disinterested preferences from willingness to pay and willingness to
accept determinations.
The compensation tests in Kaldor–Hicks efficiency led to CBA’s support from
welfare economists and agency officials (Adler and Posner, 1999). When the
government proposed a project, the public demanded justification, and CBA
allowed them to do so. Although popular throughout the 1960s, economists and
government officials began to question its practicality in the 1970s. It was difficult
to obtain relevant data, especially in measuring environmental resources and
human life. The biggest victory of welfare economists deploying the Chicago law
and economics approach was establishing the view that judges should pursue
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency and set aside distributive goals in adjudication (Cooter and
Ulen, 1999). According to them, it was impossible to redistribute through judicial
balancing, and only legislatures had the competence to deal with distribution of
resources (Polinsky, 1989). By means of the government’s tax and transfer systems,
legislative decisions were likely to be more precise than the decision of a random
judge. This enhanced skepticism toward judicial balancing expressed by welfare
economics was successfully deployed by the Raegan administration’s attack
against ‘‘judicial activism’’ (Kennedy, 2011, p. 216). Even though balancing did
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790

Comparative European Politics

Genealogies of cost–benefit analysis

not disappear from the discursive practice of judges, lawyers, and regulators,
judicial balancing was no longer highly theorized in legal academia (Kennedy,
2011, p. 217).10 Since Bush v. Gore (2000) the predominant focus of inquiry
shifted from judges to regulators and CBA became a primary legal tool for agencies
rather than courts through which agencies could rationally regulate only is the
benefits of regulation justify its costs (Sunstein, 2007).
CBA was first incorporated into the US government in 1970 through President
Nixon’s National Industrial Pollution Control Council, which focused its efforts on
the cost of increasingly stringent pollution control regulations (Tozzi, 2011). In
response to the rising cost of environmental regulation, Assistant to President
Nixon for Domestic Affairs John Ehrlichman established the Quality of Life
Committee to ensure that agencies analyze the benefits and costs during the
decision-making process (Tozzi, 2011). During this time, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the White House began a review of Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations, mandating that OMB includes analyses that
estimate the regulation’s costs and benefits. While the analytical tools used in CBA
have become more sophisticated over time, the combination of cost–benefit
analysis, comparison with regulatory alternatives, and need to justify alternatives
was analogous to subsequent maximization of net benefit requirements (Tozzi,
2011, p. 46).
President Gerald Ford was the first President to issue Executive Orders requiring
an economic analysis of regulations as part of OMB’s oversight activities.
Executive Order (EO) 11821 (1974) required all agencies to consider the
inflationary impact of all major regulations. EO 11949 expanded this, requiring
agencies to prepare economic impact statements administered by the OMB and
Council on Wage and Price Stability (OMB/CWPS). The Carter administration also
issued EO 12,044, the first executive order dedicated to regulatory review (Tozzi,
2011, p. 52).11 Alice Rogoff, Special Assistant to the Director of OMB, created the
Office of Regulatory and Information Policy (OIRA) under the OMB to review
regulations (Tozzi, 2011, p. 52). The Carter Administration also created the
Regulatory Council, an interagency group tasked with eliminating duplication of
regulations (Tozzi, 2011, p. 56).
Regulatory reform in the Reagan era replaced the social reform movements of
the twentieth century – the Progressive movement at the beginning of the twentieth
century, the New Deal of the 1930s, and the Civil Rights, Consumer, and
Environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s, with a more economic
approach to reducing ‘‘burdensome’’ regulation (Vogel, 2012, p. 258). This
approach was concerned with freedom, accountability, efficiency, and economic
growth, and economists and policy analysts dominated the discussion (McGarthy,
1986, pp. 253–254). In the midst of this social and political environment, on
February 7, 1981, President Reagan issued executive order 12,291, replacing
Carter’s executive order because it had ‘‘proven [to be] ineffective’’ (McGarthy,
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790

Comparative European Politics

Nicola

1986, p. 19). Reagan’s EO required the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) to ensure that federal regulations reduce the burdens of existing and
future regulations while increasing agency accountability for regulatory actions.
The order also provided for Presidential oversight of the regulatory process,
minimized duplication and conflict of regulations, and called for well-reasoned
regulations (McGarthy, 1986, p. 19). Under Reagan, administrative agencies began
to start taking CBA into consideration when making regulatory decisions, but the
paradigmatic executive order that led agencies to engage in cost–benefit analysis
commenced with President Clinton’s EO 12,866 in 1993 (McGarthy, 1986, p. 21;
Copeland, 2011). This order made significant modifications that simplified the
process, made it more selective, and introduced more transparency into agency
consultation. This remained a centerpiece in administrative rulemaking, which
permits analysts to compare a set of regulatory actions with the same primary
outcome (Copeland, 2011, p. 4).
In the wake of EO 12,866, Congressional initiatives sought to further the goals of
the cost–benefit analysis. The statutory provision that most likely mirrors 12,866 is
the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (Copeland, 2011, pp. 10–11).12
Currently, several agencies (not covered by 12,866 because they are independent
agencies) such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Commodities Future Trading Commission are
required to undertake a cost–benefit analysis to assess implementation of necessary
regulations in the most efficient way (Copeland, 2011, pp. 17–19). In a well-known
court opinion, Judge Patricia Wald highlighted the importance of regulatory
analysis given the complexities of governance (Lubbers, 2012).13 This shows how
cost–benefit rationales successfully penetrated not only agencies but also the
judiciary. The OMB’s Circular A-4, issued in 2003, is a formal, binding guidance
document governing the analysis of regulatory impacts by executive agencies
(Office of Management and Budget, 2003).
President Obama reinforced and expanded regulatory analysis and oversight
(Dudley, 2015). On January 18, 2011, he published EO 13,563, titled: ‘‘Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review’’ (Dudley, 2015, p. 1043). This order revised
cost–benefit analysis, allowing agencies only to proceed with regulation if the
benefits justify the costs and maximizes net benefits. Under EO 13,563 each agency
must use the best available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future
benefits and costs as accurately as possible, reflecting an unprecedented emphasis on
the importance of quantification (Executive Order No. 13,563, 2012; Sunstein, 2013).
This EO further recognizes the difficulty in quantifying certain values, including
human dignity. He further issued EO 13,579 in July 2011, encouraging independent
regulatory agencies to comply with EO 13,563 requirements concerning ‘‘public
participation, integration and innovation, regulatory approaches, and science’’
(Sunstein, 2013; Executive Order No. 13,579, 2011). Under 13,563 and 12,866,
executive agencies must submit all significant rules to OIRA, which may not be
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published in the Federal Register until OIRA completes its review (Executive Order
No. 12,866, 1994); Executive Order No. 13,563, 2012; Sunstein, 2013).
Recently, the Obama Administration turned its attention to regulatory review.
President Obama issued EO 13,610 in May 2011, titled: ‘‘Identifying and
Reducing Regulatory Burdens,’’ which directed agencies to engage the public in
their retrospective review of existing regulations, prioritize reviews that would
produce significant quantifiable savings, and report their process to OIRA
(Sunstein, 2013; Executive Order No. 13,579). The advantages of such regulatory
analysis range from the identification of options to bureaucratic accountability.
For instance, options identification allows an agency to look for more marketoriented and less-burdensome alternatives (McGarity, 2005, p. 1243). In addition,
agencies can gather and analyze information, which allow upper-level policymakers to look at the impact their decisions have on the broader society, making
them more sensitive to the economic costs of the regulation (McGarity, 2005,
p. 1262). Furthermore, agencies have a greater sense of the broader policy goal, in
which it would resist adhering to precedent and unarticulated bureaucratic folk
wisdom (McGarity, 2005, p. 1263). An agency can thus identify the gaps of
information and assumptions that the regulation rests upon. This is to provide a
better understanding how these assumptions and information gaps affect
regulatory policies (McGarity, 2005, p. 1264). Finally, regulatory analysis
restrains bureaucrats from being unduly influenced from political forces. In other
words, the remote decision makers in the White House, Congress, and reviewing
courts are assured that the decision was made in a nonpartisan fashion (McGarity,
2005, p. 1265).
Nevertheless, the Chicago law and economics rationale used in regulatory analysis
confronts excessive proceduralism to prevent red tape. This approach, taken to its
extreme, could lead to an increase in litigation for agencies to defend the current
rules. More importantly, as theorized by welfare economists, cost–benefit analysis
inappropriately quantifies things such as life, health, and environmental risk
(Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004). For some critics, this cannot produce more
efficient decisions because the process of reducing life, health, and the natural world
to monetary values is inherently flawed (Asimow et al (2014)).
As Michael Asimov has noted, cost–benefit analysis equates the risk of death
with death itself, whereas these should be accounted for separately in considering
the costs and benefits of regulatory actions (Asimow et al, 2014). It also ignores the
notion that citizens are concerned about risks to their families and others as well as
themselves, the fact that market decisions are generally distinct political decisions,
and the incomparability of many different types of risks to human life. In a similar
vein, the technique of ‘‘discounting’’ makes sense in comparing alternative
financial investments, but it cannot reasonably be used to make a choice between
preventing noneconomic harms to present generations and preventing similar
harms to future generations. Nor can discounting reasonably be used to make a
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choice between harms to the current generation; the choice between preventing an
automobile fatality and a cancer death should not turn on prevailing rates of return
on financial investments. Additionally, discounting tends to trivialize long-term
environmental risks, minimizing the very real threat our society faces from
potential catastrophes and irreversible environmental damage, such as those posed
by climate change and nuclear waste.
Finally, the Chicago law and economic genealogy of CBA has ignored
distributive questions regarding who suffers as a result of environmental problems
and therefore threatens to reinforce existing patterns of economic and social
inequality (Asimow et al, 2014, p. 2). At best, cost–benefit analysis treats questions
about equity as a side issue, which contradicts the widely-shared view that equity
should count in public policy (Asimow et al, 2014, p. 2). Poor countries,
communities, and individuals are likely to express less willingness to pay to avoid
environmental harms because they have limited resources. Some regulations are
not intended solely for the purpose of economic efficiency, but are designed to
eliminate illegitimate discrimination. Some are designed to protect cultural
aspirations, and some are designed to transform preferences. But in dealing with
cost–benefit analysis, very little attention is paid to determining the value of these
particular and often qualitative variables.
By defending cost–benefit analysis in regulatory development, behavioral legal
economists like Cass Sunstein, former Administrator of OIRA during the Obama
administration, pointed out the inherent bias the person conducting the research
might come across. Because a party naturally desires that its submissions be cast in
the most favorable light, an interested party will hire experts who exercise their
professional judgment in a way that reflects that party’s view. In addressing these
biases, Sunstein proposed that agencies should take into consideration the nature of
the risk; the controllability of the risk; whether the risk involves irretrievable or
permanent losses; whether the risk is voluntarily incurred; how equally distributed
it is for identifiable vulnerabilities, and traditionally disadvantaged victims; how
well understood the risk is; whether the risk is faced by future generations; and how
familiar everyone is with the risk (Sunstein, 2013 at 37).
According to Sunstein, CBA should promote social consensus and should
operate regardless of political commitments so that this neutral and transparent tool
should serve everyone – including those who support and criticize social,
environmental, and labor issues. In his view, CBA has significant democratic
advantages by promoting public attention to what is really at stake in a way that
increases accountability and transparency. Sunstein acknowledges the possibility
that CBA could be skewed against the poor, but he believes that this can be
corrected and de-biased within the CBA system. Finally, by reaching to some of the
underlying principles of the social genealogy of CBA, Sunstein proposes a
qualitative understanding of the interests at stake in CBA in addition to the
traditional quantitative approach (Sunstein, 2001).
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IV. Evaluating CBA Genealogies in EU–US Trade Relations
A genealogical approach departs from convergentist, divergentist, and experimentalist approaches to regulatory governance which only partially engage with the
historical contingency, different attitudes in legal reasoning and critiques of CBA
as a neutral scientific and coherent rationale for decision-making. For instance,
scholars seeking greater convergence through CBA aim to reconcile challenges in
regulatory cooperation without tracing its origin and deeply political history. In
doing so, they aim to legitimize CBA as neutral and scientific without highlighting
the fact that this entails political choices, limits the regulatory options while
endorsing excessive regulatory scrutiny.
By contrast, divergentist scholars have shown how historical contingencies and
path dependencies in administrative law regimes driven by different values resulted
in different institutional arrangement and diverge in the implementation of
regulation. By not focusing on TTIP, these scholars do not explain the crossinfluences in the recent changes in regulatory approaches, despite being skeptical of
the neutrality of CBA. For example, decreased faith in judicial balancing and
pressure under free trade agreements led European regulators to import Chicago
law and economics to increasingly shape the way the EU has broadened the scope
of application of CBA via greater use of scientific evidence for impact
assessments. While Chicago law and economic genealogy of CBA through the
‘‘willingness to pay’’ criteria and welfare economics play an increasing role in the
assessments of regulatory proposals in the EU, the social genealogy of CBA
continues to play an outsized role in assessing regulations, as illustrated by the
Commission’s insistence that the Better Regulation Agenda improve regulation instead of reducing it (European Commission, COM, 2015a).
Finally, experimentalists recognize the hybridization of the two models because
of their attempt to show how learning from regulatory differentiation led to the
adoption of more social approaches in the US which value the precautionary
principle in some sectors while increasing the use of CBA and impact assessment,
despite underlying divergences in implementation in the EU. Because some
experimentalist scholars focus on the sociology of the organization and its various
actors, they miss the relevance of legal reasoning and legal doctrines and, in
particular, the relation between balancing and proportionality and CBA (RoseAckerman, 2013). Finally, experimentalists put forward CBA as a neutral and
technical tool that, at that at time, ought to be adjusted to respond to regulatory
variation, biases or social circumstances. Overall, it reflects transparent and
efficient regulatory outcomes that pay little attention to income inequalities and
social costs.
The genealogical approach departs from the idea that cost–benefit analysis has a
linear and rational intellectual history and that its application would necessarily
become similar across the Atlantic. Yet both genealogies are not self-fulfilling
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prophecies, as they can adapt and change through political pressures, advocacy and
cross-fertilization among economists and lawyers, demonstrating the continuous
negotiation and contingency of each genealogy depending on the constituencies
involved in their application.
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Notes
1 Article x5 notes: ‘‘Specific activities promoting regulatory compatibility, (b) mutual recognition or
reliance on each other’s implementing tools, to avoid unnecessary duplication of regulatory
requirements, such as testing, certification, qualifications, audits, or inspections.’’
2 Stating
2. When carrying out a regulatory impact assessment in accordance with paragraph 1, each
Party shall ensure that it:
(a) considers the need for the proposed regulatory act and the nature and the significance of
the problem the regulatory act is intended to address; (b) examines feasible regulatory and
non-regulatory alternatives (including the option of not regulating), if any, that would achieve
the objective of the regulatory act; c. assesses potential short- and long-term social, economic,
and environmental impacts of such alternatives and the anticipated costs and benefits
(quantitative, qualitative, or both, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to
quantify).
3 Bignami offers examples of the difference between managed neo-corporatism and competitive
pluralism between the European and the US regulatory regime].
4 This conception of individual rights is traced back to classical legal thought of Savigny. In case of
conflict between two individual rights, legal professors resolved the conflict by deducing a solution
from individual rights.
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5 The social mode of thought, which characterized the 1900–1950s has recently yielded to a third
globalization of ‘‘americanized’’ legal thinking. This mode consists of a neo-formalist revival in the
law, once more understood as a merely technocratic artifact serving the needs of economic expansion
rather than those of human civilization and solidarity. In a sense, the ‘‘social’’ has been finally
abandoned while a mode of reasoning derived from the social, namely balancing between conflicting
policies, is still predominant in current legal thinking.
6 Cassis is the landmark decision concerning the free movement of goods and the elimination of
measures equivalent to quantitative restriction to trade, namely protectionist or domestic legislation.
7 See Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
8 Commenting on Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007
E.C.R. I-11767 and Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line
ABP, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779.
9 Article 289 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
10 Explaining the balancing retreat in the US after 1980s.
11 Identifying OMB in a regulatory oversight role for the first time.
12 Pursuant to UMRA, agencies are mandated to prepare a ‘‘written statement’’ that contains a
qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits as well as the effect of
the Federal mandate on health, safety, and natural environment.
13 Jeff Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking. Quoting Judge Wald as stating that
the court recognizes the basic need of the President and his White House staff to monitor the
consistency of executive agency regulations with Administration policy. […] Regulations
demand a careful weighing of cost, environmental, and energy considerations. They also have
broad implications for national economic policy. Our form of government simply could not
function effectively or rationally if key executive policymakers were isolated from each other
and from the Chief Executive.
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